shacks'.
1 Thirty years later, the house is in much better shape and its residents' spirits are high: 'Everyone seems to be getting along these days' and 'intellectual history is ascendant in the profession,' Darrin McMahon and Samuel Moyn reported in 2014. 2 As the field gains confidence, it is becoming more extroverted. A leading symptom of its outward-looking exuberance is the international turn in intellectual history. for modern international thought. They inspire hope that other foundations still remain to be uncovered. 4 The question of what may count as a foundation bedevils any genealogical inquiry. A foundation is evidently not the same as an origin-that 'beginning which is also a cause,' as Marc Bloch put it when diagnosing the 'embryogenic obsession' that had spread from religious exegetes to his fellow historians. 5 But foundations are by definition fundamental. They mark a terminus beyond which investigation cannot go further without the risk of infinite regress. It was to combat just that kind of regress that I
specified in FMIT what I took to be some of the foundational features of peculiarly modern international thought: the separation of the domestic and the foreign; the primacy of states over all other actors in the external realm, including individuals and corporations; international law as the positive law of a system of states under conditions of international anarchy; and the states-system as a self-policing club with its own hierarchical standards of admission and exclusion. 6 These properties could not be found-at least, not all found together-in the pre-modern period; many, if not all, have broken down in the age of so-called post-modernity. With these limits in mind, my own aim was not simply to dig down to the foundations in search of something solid but rather to unsettle some of the most basic mythologies of contemporary international thought. 7 If that narrowed the range of historical resources available for present purposes-for example, by expelling Thomas Hobbes from the canon of international theory-then that would at least release the past from the grip of our own concerns while allowing us to improvise our own conceptual resources.
Antony Black, by contrast, has attempted to expand the meaning of the international by digging far deeper than most in search of the foundations of international thought. He has even delved into what is conventionally called pre-history to discern in pre-political behaviour 'two prevailing patterns of international thought: cosmopolitanism and realism,' based respectively on human amity and enmity. Black then follows his themes through the Axial Age and onwards to early modernity. He finds racism and globalism in ancient Egypt, nationalism in Israel and 'inter-state relations of a kind not too dissimilar to those of modern Europe' among the Greek city-states, a set of relations which in turn bred 'humanist universalism or cosmopolitanism' in contrast to the particularist universalism of the Chinese world order. 20 If that is so-as Bain argues-and the law of nature is divine law, then the ius gentium must logically also derive from the laws of God.
Any sphere in which divine law is supreme could hardly be anarchic in the sense of uncontrolled or entirely lawless. Hobbesian anarchy, Bain concludes, has a metaphysical grounding in a specific theology. A less 'anarchic' and more cooperative picture of humans' propensity to work together and make alliances in the state of nature has already begun to emerge in recent literature on Hobbes, even without invoking a theological foundation for his account. 21 The assimilation of Grotius and Hobbes as representatives of a common 'modern' tradition of natural law has also been a signal achievement of the last generation of scholarship: no international intellectual historian would now argue for the caricatural opposition between the two thinkers that underpinned accounts of distinct traditions of international thought. 22 The conflation of the laws of nature-and hence, the law of nations-with the laws of God may yet not be quite complete. As I noted in FMIT, the thirteenth law of nature that Hobbes enumerated Hobbes provided them with the inspiration to theorise the international realm as anarchic.
International thought was already in place before Hobbes was cemented into its foundations; Hobbes himself was not fundamental to the formation of international thought. In FMIT, I did note one important exception to that generalisation: the judgment, often repeated across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by theorists within the natural law tradition from Pufendorf to Vattel, that Hobbes was an inspiring innovator for identifying the law of nations with the law of nature.
28 Boucher refers to many of the same sources but valuably adds to the negative side of the ledger Samuel Rachel's 1676 attack on Hobbes. Rachel distinguished the ius gentium commune (common to all peoples) from the ius gentium proprium (among those bound by their common agreements with each other). 29 Later positivists would also make this move, often in tandem with an appeal to a standard of civilisation which bound the treating parties in mutual recognition. Rachel placed the law of nature above the law of nations and attributed obligatory force to it due to its divine origin. His interpretation of Hobbes on the law of nations might cast some doubt on Bain's theological reading, which appears at the very least contestable from within the broad tradition of natural jurisprudence itself.
As Boucher shows, the gradual detachment of international law from the law of nature in the nineteenth century left Hobbes exclusively as a theorist of domestic political thought-at least until the theorists of anarchy began to invoke him as a talisman, ' International Journal of Constitutional Law, 11 (2013) , 826-31; Edward Devetak rightly says, 'foundations of modern international thought were fashioned in diverse disciplinary and vernacular languages' (000): without attention to those many languages, and the genres they informed, our view of the foundations will be necessarily incomplete.
What, then, can be learned by examining history-writing as a source for international thought? Devetak's essay suggests three answers. First, we need to extend our chronological horizons in search of historiographical, rather than simply political, 
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The creation of the international as a category demanded exclusion as well as inclusion. By the late twentieth century, the international had become universal in the most basic sense that it was planetary in scale: few parts of the Earth's surface, including the oceans, evaded its reach. suggests that a reconsideration of the law of peoples is long overdue, to accommodate indigenous demands for dignity and recognition both domestically and internationally.
This will be no easy task even in a world that is almost entirely postcolonial but still far from post-imperial. Imperial histories of exclusion and hierarchy, of the fastening of territoriality and the constitution of 'peoples,' will be an enduring burden. Australia and America, 1788 -1836 (Cambridge, MA, 2010 ; Saliha Belmessous, ed., Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600 -1900 (New York, 2014 . structure of a conception of global justice be that took history and plurality seriously?' (000).
To answer that important question would be impossible without a consideration of the history of sovereignty, the main subject of Terry Nardin's essay. 'The main impact of the idea of the sovereign state on the international order,' Nardin asserts, 'was a kind of contraction'. 53 With the universal diffusion of sovereignty, non-state entities lost whatever vestiges of sovereignty-of autonomy among other autonomous entities-they may once have possessed. To put it in another idiom, the spread of sovereignty was a means of reducing complexity in the international system. In pre-modern international Sovereignty is foundational to international thought: 'not only a topic within international thought but also one that defines the subject' (000), as Nardin notes. But what are the foundations of international sovereignty? Nardin sees sovereignty as essentially paradoxical in two ways. As a claim to supremacy over a specific territory, sovereignty demands a normative justification for freedom from interference by other sovereign claims. Justification in turn implies adjudication: if a sovereign judge must decide competing claims to sovereignty, then even the successful plaintiff will have to acknowledge a sovereign superior, who must acknowledge their own superior, and so on.
Moreover, sovereignty implies grounding, and grounding implies founding. Unless the founding takes place entirely de novo, it will by definition be 'illegitimate because it involves overturning an already established system of authority' (000). This problem strikes at the heart of the problem of creating new states in the international system. 56 The first major attempt to tackle it was in 1776, on the occasion of the U.S. and by scholars in other parts of the world, increases' (000).
International intellectual history will only be able to claim to be inclusive when it encompasses the contributions of women as well as those by men. Glenda Sluga justly indicts FMIT of partiality when she notes that it treats only 'the landmarks of a heavily subscribed Anglo-centric canon of political thinkers, completely male' (000). I can make no plea in mitigation against this charge, except to remark meekly that because my aim was to subvert an existing (completely male) canon, I had to work within its confines.
Yet that plea is patently insufficient. Genuinely unsettling the canon demands standing well outside its traditional limits, whether in terms of language, geography or, in this case, gender. The results so far have been promising but uneven. International intellectual history has already transformed the study of Mary Wollstonecraft by tracing the reception of her works and the proliferation of her image in Europe and the Americas. 61 In contrast, commentaries on classic twentieth-century texts of international relations includes only two essays, out of twenty-four, on works by women, for instance. 62 Gendering the foundations of modern international thought has so far consumed relatively little scholarly energy. Sluga's essay provides strong incentives to overcome that hesitation.
An outstanding instance of women's international thought is Germaine De Stäel, one of the most cosmopolitan thinkers of the early nineteenth century, the possible inventor of the term 'liberalism,' a vigorous promoter of ideas without borders, 'a perpetual motion machine who stirs up the salons,' in Napoleon's anxiously dismissive phrase. 63 
